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Abstract  
This paper investigates the effects of the deep transformations undergone by West European parties in 
the aftermath of the Berlin Wall fall on their relationship with the electorate. Attention is devoted in 
particular to the changing content of individuals’ partisan attachments, which we hypothesize to have 
changed from a mere reflection of previous social and ideological identities to the result of individual 
attitudes towards parties and partisan objects. The main objective of this analysis is to show the nowa-
days prominent part played by voters’ attitudes towards one of these ‘objects’ – party leaders – in 
determining psychological attachments with the parties. We concentrate on the main two cleavage-
based parties in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands in the period between 1990 and the most recent 
election for which National Election Study data is available. By means of logistic regression analysis, it 
is shown the constantly declining ability of ‘identity’ items (e.g., social class, union membership, church 
attendance, region of residence) to predict individual feelings of partisan attachment, as well as the 
correspondingly growing part played by voters’ attitudes towards issues, performance evaluation, and 
party leaders – the latter having become nowadays of crucial relevance in each country under analysis. 
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1 Introduction1 
According to the party government model, parties are the key link between various elements of the 
political process: they create identities, frame electoral choices, and determine the outputs of govern-
ment. In this respect, democracy without political parties is simply ‘unthinkable’ (Schattschneider, 
1942; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). Nonetheless, political parties have been severely challenged in 
recent decades under many respects. Social modernization and technological innovations, in particu-
lar, have led to new forms of interest representation and political communication that affected to a 
substantial extent the role of parties in the democratic process, thus altering their relationship with 
citizens. To cope with these challenges, parties have undergone deep structural transformations.  
The widespread erosion of traditional socio-political cleavages encountered in almost every advanced 
industrial democracy (Franklin et al., 1992; Dalton, 2000) has resulted in a progressive individualiza-
tion of vote choices. This has involved “a shift away from a style of electoral decision-making based on 
social group and/or party cues toward a more individualized and inwardly oriented style of political 
choice”, mainly based on “policy preferences, performance judgments, or candidate images” (Dalton, 
1996: 346). In turn, this has made necessary for class-mass parties to reshape their appeal in order to 
extend the electoral basin beyond the socio-ideological cleavages to which they usually referred. This 
process of transformation, already previewed by Downs (1957) and further detailed by Kirchheimer 
(1966), found its symbolical culmination in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – a turning point after 
which parties could not be thought anymore as representing “bodies of particular principle”, but ra-
ther as “vote maximizing agents without any real ideologies of their own” (Daalder, 2002: 52). As a 
result, contemporary catch-all parties have become de- ideological in nature, highly flexible in their 
issue programmes, and tend to base increasingly their election profiles on features more engaging to 
voters – such as the leadership factor (Evans and Andersen, 2005; Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 
2000). 
The increasing focus on the personality of individual leaders is also due to the changing patterns of 
political communication in contemporary democracies. The emergence of television as main source of 
political information for a vast majority of the Western publics has been crucial in emphasizing the 
role of political leaders at the expense of parties, making the latter “more dependent in their commu-
nications with voters on the essentially visual and personality-based medium of television” (Mughan, 
2000: 129). Personalization has been defined as “the more general, pervasive, and fundamental ele-
ment in the process of change of electoral campaigns” (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Television-based 
campaigning accentuates personality factors at the expense of ideology and programmatic goals. In 
such context, “leaders may well find themselves better able to influence what the electoral strategy 
and appeal of their party should be” (Curtice, 2003: 16). 
In this article, we will attempt to assess the effects of these transformations on the parties’ relation-
ship with the electorate. In particular, our attention will be devoted to the changing nature and con-
tent of individuals’ feelings of psychological attachment with political parties. In spite of the numer-
ous contestations targeted to the concept at both theoretical and empirical level (Budge et al., 1976; 
Thomassen, 1976; Budge, 2009; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009; contra: Greene and Schickler, 2009), we 
remain convinced of the enduring importance of partisanship in cross-national research (this convic-
tion being shared with, among others: Richardson, 1991; Holmberg, 1994; Berglund et al., 2005; 
Schmitt, 2009). As long as party-based democracies are around, “people’s different relationships with 
the major actors – the parties – must be conceptualized and measured” (Holmberg, 2007: 566). In this 
respect, partisanship is a fundamental indicator of the bond between parties and the electorate (Fiori-
                                                        
1  This publication is based on work done during the author’s stay as a guest of the EUROLAB at GESIS. 
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na, 2002: 98), and is thus widely employed as a dimension of party system development (Dalton and 
Weldon, 2007) and stability (Scarrow, 2010).  
There are many routes by which voters may become ‘partisan’ (Erikson et al., 2002). In its classic for-
mulation set forth in The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) partisanship is conceived as a long-
term affective orientation to a political party, which is rooted in early socialization and based on an 
objective location in the social structure. Yet the social identity approach represents only one explana-
tion of partisanship: its development as a result of ideological proximity, past performance or favora-
ble leader evaluations represents another plausible explanation (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009: 201).  
Our analysis moves from the assumption that, like all political attitudes, partisanship is responsive to 
the set of alternatives available in a political system at a particular point in time (Crewe, 1976). Pre-
vious studies have indeed demonstrated how specific party characteristics contribute to distinctive 
types of partisanship (Richardson, 1991). Therefore, the erosion of stable sources of political orienta-
tion (e.g., social cleavages, ideologies) and the resulting transformation of former class-mass parties in 
Western democracies lead us to hypothesize that partisan loyalties have shifted accordingly from a 
mere reflection of previous social and ideological identities (as postulated by the Michigan conception 
of party identification) to the result of individual attitudes towards more visible partisan objects (Con-
verse, 1995). In particular, the aim of our analysis is to show the (nowadays prominent) part played by 
voters’ attitudes towards one of these ‘objects’ – party leaders – in determining psychological attach-
ments with the parties. We base our contention on a number of related occurrences, and most notably 
the widespread practice of candidate-centered campaigning (Wattenberg, 1991; Swanson and Manci-
ni, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000), the resulting increased influence of leaders in shaping the appeal of 
their parties (McAllister, 1996; Curtice, 2003), but also the growing tendency among voters to evaluate 
politics in personal rather than partisan terms (Sorauf, 1985; Rahn et al., 1990; Pierce, 1993; Campus, 
2000). 
The choice of cases under analysis – against which our research hypotheses will be tested – is based on 
the ‘Most Different Systems Design’ (Landman, 2008). We have chosen three established parliamentary 
democracies in Western Europe – Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – connoted by sharp differences 
in terms of electoral system, size of party system and structure of political competition. Our attention 
will be concentrated on the two major cleavage-based parties in each nation, that is, those belonging 
to the main ideological families (e.g., Christian-democrats and socialists), in the period between 1990 
and the most recent national election for which National Election Study data is available2. By means of 
logistic regression analysis, it will be shown the constantly declining ability of ‘identity’ items (e.g., 
social class, union membership, church attendance, region of residence) to predict individual feelings 
of partisan attachment, as well as the correspondingly growing part played by voters’ attitudes to-
wards party leaders. 
The article proceeds as follows: we first present the relevant literature on partisanship, in order to 
formulate our research hypotheses (Section 2); these will be tested against the Dutch, German and 
Italian cases (rationale for the cases chosen in Section 3) at both bivariate and multivariate level (Sec-
tion 4). Finally, the results of the empirical analysis will be discussed along with their implications for 
further research (Section 5). 
                                                        
2 Presumably, the process we are hypothesizing started way before 1990 due to longer-term trends of moderniza-
tion and secularization among Western societies. However, we decided to concentrate on the last two decades 
in virtue of the obvious acceleration ignited to the process of party transformation by the fall of Berlin Wall, as 
well as for reasons of data availability (the first Italian National Election Study has in fact been conducted in 
1990). 
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2 Two Conceptions of Partisanship: Identity and Attitudinal 
Approaches 
In this study, we will stick to a minimal definition of partisanship, namely, the “tendency of voters to 
repeatedly vote for the same party” (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009: 5). There are essentially two explana-
tions of this tendency in the literature: the identity and attitudinal approaches (ibid.). 
The identity approach describes party identification as “the individual’s affective orientation to an 
important group-object in his environment” (Campbell et al., 1960: 121). This sense of ‘we feeling’ can 
be focused either on primary (e.g., race, religion, social class) or secondary groups (e.g., the parties 
themselves), and it is mainly product of early socialization. The analytical usefulness of the concept lies 
in its relative stability and distance from the vote. Party identification is in fact conceived as an un-
moved mover: that is, a non-political attitude (hence supposedly immune from political and economic 
short-term influences), which is nonetheless able to shape the individuals’ political world-view in a 
way that accords with their partisan orientation.  On these bases, partisanship is thought to be cause – 
but not consequence – of less stable attitudes and opinions about political objects (e.g., political 
events, issues and candidates). To put it sharply, the identity approach sees partisanship as “an ex-
ogenous variable affecting politics but not being affected by politics” (Holmberg, 2007: 563).  
Reciprocal causation, however, can represent a problem in this context. As it has been observed, 
“[p]arty identification is shaping behaviours, attitudes, and perceptions at the same time as it is shaped 
by attitudes and perceptions” (ibid. 562). Claims of this sort have led to an intrinsically different view 
of partisanship – simply, a positive/negative disposition toward an attitude object (Converse, 1995). 
Already the authors of The American Voter spoke about the role of attitudes as “potential agents of 
change in the individual’s basic partisan orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960: 135). In the 1970s a group 
of “revisionists” (Fiorina, 2002) openly questioned the non-political definition of party identification 
set forth by Campbell and colleagues, putting emphasis on the importance of cognitive factors as 
formative aspects behind individuals’ partisan alignments. A number of studies explored in detail the 
dynamic relationship between partisan affiliations and short-term attitudes (e.g., performance evalua-
tions, issues and candidates), demonstrating the absence of a clear causal sequence from the former to 
the latter (Page and Jones, 1979; Fiorina, 1981).  
In drawing a sharp distinction between these two approaches, we do not imply that one perspective is 
correct at the expense of the other. Following Rosema (2006), we rather believe that 
“partisanship may be conceptualized in terms of identification as well as evaluation. Which 
conceptualization one prefers will depend on how one views political parties (as groups to 
which voters may belong, or as organizations that voters may like or dislike)” (Rosema, 2006: 
470). 
Like all political attitudes, partisanship is supposedly responsive to the particular set of political alter-
natives available in the political system (Crewe, 1976). Therefore, the nature and shape of partisan ties 
must be influenced to at least some extent by the specific characteristics of political parties them-
selves (Richardson, 1991). Old cleavage parties were characterized by a tight link with their respective 
social milieu and, in this sense, they could be conceived as groups to which partisans ‘belonged’ 
(Campbell and Valen, 1966; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Thomassen, 1976; Parisi and Pasquino, 1977). 
However, the process of transformation undergone by Western class-mass parties in the last decades 
has led these parties to a progressive de-attachment from the socio-ideological cleavages to which 
they usually referred (Katz and Mair, 1995). According to the original Michigan conception of party 
identification, favorable attitudes towards partisan objects are caused by long-term loyalties based on 
group membership. But if it is true (as we expect) that contemporary partisanship is not anymore a 
consequence of socialization forces, then we can assume that partisanship is caused exactly by those 
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attitudes that the identity approach conceive as consequence of previous identifications. Based on this 
assumption, we hypothesize that the process of party change has transformed the nature of partisan-
ship from a reflection of previous social identities to the product of individual attitudes towards par-
ties and partisan objects.  
Among the possible sources of individual attitudes, the literature assigns a crucial place to issue prefe-
rences. The standard model of rational decision-making based on issues, as applied to the study of 
voting behavior, is the spatial model developed by Anthony Downs (1957). Voters and parties are 
placed on a left-right continuum – a “super-issue which summarizes the programmes of opposing 
groups” (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 244). In turn, ideological/policy proximity between the par-
ties and the voter is responsible for the promotion of positive (or negative) attitudes towards each of 
the parties (Budge et al., 1976), and eventually determines voters’ choices (Dalton, 2008: 198-204).  
Another important source of attitudes towards parties is represented by valence issues – that is, in-
stances in which there is a wide consensus over what goals are desirable (e.g., corruption-free govern-
ment, management of the economy and public services), but there is conflict over which party is best 
at delivering them (Stokes, 1963). Attitudes can derive in this case by either retrospective evaluations 
of party performance (Fiorina, 1981) or prospective competence assessments (Bellucci, 2006).  
Attitudes towards parties can also originate from the voters’ evaluation of other objects strongly asso-
ciated with the image of parties themselves, such as their leaders (Page and Jones, 1979). Already in 
1968, V. O. Key anticipated a later, cognitive psychological view of partisanship, hypothesizing that 
“[l]ike or dislike of a political personality…bring shifts in party identification” (Key, 1968; quoted in 
Clarke et al., 2004). According to this interpretation, partisanship is moved by individual attitudes 
toward the party as personified by the leader, and therefore feelings of closeness should be brought 
back to the party “in the form of its leader” (Barisione, 2009).  
Indeed, we contend that this interpretation is ever more appropriate in the light of the progressive 
personalization of politics in Western democracies (McAllister, 2007). In the last decades, there is little 
doubt that party leaders have increasingly gained importance to both political communication and 
electoral competition vis-à-vis their parties in almost every Western democracy. Impressionistic evi-
dence of this trend include the substitution of leader images for party symbols during election cam-
paigns (McAllister, 1996), the media’s increasing propensity to mention candidates rather than the 
parties they belong to (Dalton et al., 2000), and the tendency to portray executives in a personalized 
fashion – these being routinely labeled after the name of their leaders (Bean and Mughan, 1989). In 
the light of this, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that political leaders have become important 
in their own right “by personifying the policy platforms of their respective parties” (McAllister, 2007: 
574). Empirical evidence shows that this is actually the case: a pervasive tendency among contempo-
rary voters is in fact that of evaluating politics in personal rather than partisan terms (Rahn et al., 
1990; Pierce, 1993; Campus, 2000). On these bases, we hypothesize that favorable attitudes towards 
the leaders have become a stronger – and by now the strongest – determinant of individual feelings of 
closeness to parties. 
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3 Germany, Italy and the Netherlands: Reasons of a Comparison 
Our research hypotheses will be tested through a comparative analysis of three established parliamen-
tary democracies in Western Europe: Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The process of case selection 
rests on the Most Different Systems Design (Landman, 2008). The three countries are in fact connoted 
by sharp differences in terms of electoral system (pure proportional in the Netherlands, mixed in Ger-
many, majoritarian – with caveats – in Italy in the period 1993-2005), size of party system (limited 
multipartism in Germany, extreme multipartism in the Netherlands, structural bipolarism in Italy) and 
structure of political competition. Verifying our hypotheses in these three nations will boost our confi-
dence in the role of party transformation as the prime mover behind the changing patterns of partisan 
attachment at the individual level. 
There are strong reasons to believe that our expectations can be by and large fulfilled within the Ital-
ian case. In the First Italian Republic (1946-1993), the stability of party identifications was especially 
accentuated by the tight link between social groups and the main parties of that time (e.g., DC and 
PCI). In such context, partisanship was regarded as  
“a social and political cleavage...the result of a sharing of cultural values, an objective loca-
tion in the social structure, a membership (or closeness and trust) in secondary organisations, 
a territorial base. It was a form of social embeddedness, a closure in distinctive and separate 
political sub-cultures and enclaves which Italian mass parties were able to bring about” (Bel-
lucci, 2007: 57-58). 
Although the identity approach did provide a suitable explanation of the ties between voters and 
parties in pre-1994 Italy, the same approach does not seem appropriate for an account of the nature 
of mass partisanship in the Second Republic. Italy is in fact the only country among established indus-
trial democracies to have recently experienced the simultaneous dissolution of almost all main parties 
from an election (e.g., 1992) to another (1994). With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War 
pattern that had marked Italian politics since the end of WW2 suddenly lost its historical meaning. In 
such context the old partitocrazia, already weakened by an erosion of the stable social cleavages on 
which it was based and eventually wiped out by Tangentopoli scandals, left the way to a new kind of 
post-ideological, highly “personalistic” parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003) – well exemplified by the 
sudden emergence of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.  
The fall of ideologies, the subsequent disappearance of traditional mass-integration parties from the 
Italian political scene after Tangentopoli, and the intrinsically catch-all nature of the parties that took 
their place since the election of 1994, make us doubtful of a reconstruction of mass partisanship based 
on social and political cleavages. In line with the empirical evidence presented in earlier analyses (see: 
Venturino, 2000; Garzia, 2009; 2011), we would rather point to the increasingly crucial role played by 
leader evaluations in determining individuals’ feelings of closeness to the new parties. Notwithstand-
ing the clear lack of solid socio-ideological bases among contemporary Italian parties, these are in fact 
entities to which substantial parts of the electorate still feel close to (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Voters Close to a Party (1979-2008) 
 
Sources: [DE] Mair et al., 2004; German Federal Election Study 2005 [IT] Eurobarometer 1979-1994; Itanes 1996-
2008 [NL] Thomassen and Rosema, 2009 
Obviously, one should note that such abrupt pattern of party system transformation is definitely un-
common in the Western experience. In the wide majority of established European democracies, politi-
cal parties did undergo a long, and at times hard, process of adaptation to the new context (e.g., ero-
sion of social cleavages, fall of ideologies, mediatization and personalization of politics) but by no 
means disappeared. It is for this reason that we decided to compare Italy with the Dutch and German 
cases. These countries are in fact marked by sharp differences vis-à-vis Italy in the developmental 
trajectory of their party systems (e.g., adaptation rather than change). If our research hypotheses were 
vindicated also against the Dutch and German cases, this would rule out the uniqueness of the Italian 
experience and boost our confidence in the role of party transformation as causal determinant of the 
changing nature of partisan attachments.  
The period under analysis begins in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall fall and covers the last two dec-
ades. Our interest in this particular time frame relates to (a) the peculiar ways in which personalization 
have replaced socio-ideological aspects of the political competition and (b) the interesting patterns of 
aggregate partisanship in each of these countries. Let us briefly review these points in turn. 
There are probably few words able to characterize better the politics of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many than Parteienstaat and Kanzelerdemokratie. The first connotes the crucial role of political par-
ties in the constitutional setting, while the second refers to the dominant figure of the Chancellor in 
the German system of governance (Saalfeld, 2000). After a long period of balance between the two, 
the last decades have witnessed a marked decline in the public image of political parties (Arzheimer, 
2006) and a correspondingly growing exposure of the Chancellors (as well as that of individual candi-
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Although German campaigns have always been centered on candidates to some extent, it is only in the 
1990s that the notion of personalization is, for the first time, discussed at length (Brettschneider and 
Gabriel, 2002). The charismatic figure of Helmut Kohl has been crucial in this respect, and his success-
ful endurance on the political scene led ultimately his contenders and successors to follow suit. This 
was especially evident in the 2002 campaign, which large parties focused “almost exclusively” on their 
chancellor-candidates (Poguntke, 2005). The increasingly central role of the personality features of 
political leaders on their parties’ appeal is further corroborated by analyses of party structures, which 
testify of an unambiguous adoption of catch-all, leader-centered electoral strategies on the behalf of 
the major German parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003).  
Contrary to the German and Italian cases, the Netherlands are hardly a case in point with respect to 
personalization. The Dutch civil society has long been founded on pillars, and virtually all areas of 
social life, including politics, were organized along the principles of religion and ideology (Andeweg 
and Irwin, 2003). Accordingly, the voters’ relationship with parties was based on their belonging to the 
pillars, thus leaving little room for leading politicians’ personality to affect their political attitudes and 
behavior (Irwin and van Holsteyn, 1989). However, the erosion of pillars and the resulting deterioration 
of traditional bonds between parties and voters have led also Dutch parties to reshape their appeal on 
increasingly volatile voters by highlighting “the qualities of individual politicians”, and most notably 
the “managerial skills of their prime ministerial candidates” (Fiers and Krouwel, 2005: 151). A crucial 
step towards the personalization of Dutch politics is represented by the 2002 election, which saw the 
entrance of Pim Fortuyn on the political scene. His flamboyant rhetoric gained him an unprecedented 
attention in the media (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003), in spite of the fact that he was formally an outsid-
er with no party or formal political position to talk about (de Graaf, 2010). Fortuyn can be credited 
with changing the Dutch political landscape to a substantial extent, and in particular the way in which 
politics is presented to the public. Nowadays, it is common for Dutch campaigns to be depicted as 
horse races between the major parties’ leaders (Fiers and Krouwel, 2005). Accordingly, party structures 
have eventually converged around a small group of party leaders as key decision-makers within the 
party (Andeweg, 2000). 
Along with the peculiar patterns of personalization in their political systems, our interest in these 
three countries is also related to the interesting patterns of aggregate partisanship that are observed 
in the last two decades (see Figure 1). Against an international trend of partisan dealignment (Dalton, 
2000), we find signs of substantial stability since the early 1990s in the Netherlands, and even a signif-
icant increase in Germany since the 2000s (in 2006, the percentage of German voters declaring to feel 
close to a party is roughly comparable to that of the late 1970s). The case of Italy is slightly more 
complex: there is a steady downward movement, began in the mid-1980s because of the growing 
disaffection with parties, and culminated with the fall of the First Republic. After a peak in 1996, 
probably due to the widespread enthusiasm with the new political experience, the figure gets progres-
sively down to roughly 50 percent. Although the trend line speaks unequivocally of a constant erosion 
of partisan ties, we must also note the major restructuration undergone by the Italian party system in 
both early-1990s and late-2000s – an occurrence that makes us indeed surprised of the substantial 
hold in the figure relative to aggregate partisanship (in 2008, an Italian out of two keeps declaring to 
feel close to one of the parties). 
It would thus seem that partisanship has remained somewhat valuable to the Dutch, German, and 
Italian electorates, and especially in the most recent decades. Bearing this in mind, we now turn to the 
empirical section of our analysis. 
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4 Data Analysis 
In the empirical analysis, we will assess the determinants of individual partisanship with respect to the 
two major parties belonging to the Christian-democrat and socialist families respectively in each 
country3. The parties under analysis are thus SPD and CDU for the German case, and PvdA and CDA for 
the Dutch. The abrupt changes in the Italian party system occurred in the early 1990s have led us to a 
slightly more difficult process of case selection. Eventually, we decided to base our choice on the crite-
rion of electoral relevance. With respect to the socialist family, we therefore chose the Communist 
Party (PCI) along with its major heirs (e.g., Partito Democratico della Sinistra, Democratici di Sinistra, 
Partito Democratico), while on the right-hand of the political spectrum, we picked Silvio Berlusconi’s 
Forza Italia (since 2008: Popolo delle Libertà) as follower of the Christian Democracy’s (DC) electoral 
tradition. 
The dependent variable of our analysis relies on the root question of party identification battery in 
each survey. One notes that question wording is hardly comparable throughout countries (see Appen-
dix B); however, considerable semantic similarities are found between the ways in which respondents 
are asked about their attachment to parties (‘leaning towards’ in Germany, ‘feeling closer to’ in Italy, 
‘being an adherent of’ in the Netherlands). Furthermore, question wording has been kept constant in 
each national survey, thus allowing for safe intra-country comparison. According to Dalton (2010), 
this question sacrifices “the notion of long-term partisan identity for a feeling of closeness to a party”, 
but at the same time taps “affinity to a party separate from the vote, and it can be used in systems 
with diverse party traditions” (159). 
The choice to stick to the directional component of partisanship alone (Holmberg, 1994) is based on 
the very aim of this research – that is, understanding the reason why respondents “select a response 
that indicated they ‘think of themselves as’ X or Y” (Bartle and Bellucci, 2009: 201) in spite of the 
transient shifts to which the strength component is often subject (Miller, 1991). We have thus gener-
ated a number of dummy variables – one per party under analysis – coding ‘1’ respondents declaring 
to feel close to that specific party and ‘0’ all others. 
The independent variables included in the analysis correspond to the indicators that are supposed to 
tap both social and attitudinal partisanship. As to the former, we include the respondent’s frequency 
of church attendance, subjective social class4, region of residence5, and trade union membership (vari-
able coding in Appendix C); we also control for standard socio-demographic variables (e.g., gender, 
age, and educational level). For what concerns the attitudinal dimensions of partisanship, our analysis 
include indicators related to issue proximity (measured as the distance in absolute value between the 
respondent’s placement of self and the party on a left-right scale ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’), party leader 
evaluation (thermometer score on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘10’), and – when available – performance eval-
uation (respondent’s opinion on the economic performance of the incumbent government, ranging 
from a value of ‘0’ when very negative to a value of ‘10’ if very positive). 
                                                        
3 We decided to concentrate on (former) class-mass parties alone as the process outlined in this paper (e.g., de-
cline of ideologies and cleavage-based politics, resulting transformations at the party level) can be thought to 
exert its effects mainly on the relationship between voters and this kind of parties. 
4 Not available in the German dataset. 
5 In the case of Italy we created three categories for the Northern, Central and Southern regions respectively, in 
the light of the traditional dominance of centre-right parties in the North and centre-left parties in the so-
called Red Belt (Parisi and Pasquino, 1977; Bellucci, 2007). As to the German case, this variable is a dummy cod-
ing ‘0’ respondents from the West (including Berlin) and ‘1’ those from the East. With respect to the Nether-
lands, regional differences in terms of partisan affiliations do not seem strong enough (Andeweg and Irwin, 
2003) to justify separate codings.  
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4.1 Bivariate Analysis 
A first hint of the growing correspondence between individual respondents’ evaluation of party lead-
ers and their feelings of closeness to parties comes from the point-biserial correlation coefficients6 of 
these two variables as reported in Table 1.  
Table 1:  Point-Biserial Correlations: Leader Evaluation and Partisanship (1990-2006) 
 
              
  Germany   Italy   The Netherlands   
  Year SPD CDU   Year PCI/PDS DC/FI   year PvdA CDA   
  1990 .456 .525   1990 .350 .350   1994 .236 .248   
  1994 .414 .559   
1996 .454 .389 
  
1998 .204 .359 
  














                        
  2002 .468 .540   2001 .391 .415   2002 .265 .302   















                      
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
 
At first, we observe that all coefficients are statistically significant (p < .01) and positively signed – 
that is, partisanship is always significantly related to more favorable party leader evaluations. With 
respect to the magnitude of the coefficients, the table shows a substantial increase throughout time. 
The pattern is especially clear in the case of Italian centre-right parties, where the value of the corre-
lation coefficients rises monotonically during the period 1990-2006. With regard to centre-left par-
ties, the upwards trend is disturbed by a peak in 1996, in all probabilities due to the extraordinary 
popularity enjoyed at the time by the Left-Democrats leader Massimo D’Alema (Garzia, 2009: 16). 
However, if one observes the mean values of the correlation coefficients relative to each decade, the 
increasing correspondence between partisanship and party leader evaluation emerges more clearly.  
To be sure, correlation does not prove causation, and even if we have theoretical reasons – at least, for 
the cases at hand – to believe that the causal sequence between voters’ attitudes toward party leaders 
and partisanship runs from the former to the latter, we still need to rule out other potential explana-
                                                        
6 The point-biserial correlation coefficient is a special case of Pearson in which one variable (either dependent or 
independent) is quantitative and the other variable is dichotomous (Howell, 2009). 
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tions. To this purpose, a multivariate analysis assessing the role of leader evaluations controlling for 
the effect of all other variables is in order. 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate analysis consists in two steps. In the first part, the sources of partisanship will be 
assessed through a comparison of the relative explanatory power of identity items vis-à-vis attitudinal 
ones. This part is aimed at showing that – consistently with our preliminary hypothesis – partisan 
loyalties have shifted from a mere reflection of previous social and ideological identities to the result 
of individual attitudes towards more visible partisan objects7. In the second part, we will compare the 
relative strength of attitudinal items as determinants of alignments with each of the parties under 
analysis. In this way, we will be able to demonstrate the growing impact of leader evaluations as op-
posed to other potential sources of attitudes (e.g., issue proximity, performance evaluations). 
 Twenty-eight different logistic regression analyses have been performed on data from the period 
1990-2008. In every instance, the dependent variable is a dummy coding ‘1’ the respondents identified 
with the party under analysis, and ‘0’ apartisans as well as identifiers with parties other than the one 
under scrutiny. Two blocks of predictors have been subsequently included. The first block includes 
identity items (church attendance, union membership, social class, and region of residence) and stan-
dard socio-demographic controls (gender, age, educational level; coefficients are not shown), while 
the second block features attitudinal items (issue proximity, performance, and leader evaluation). 
Logistic regression estimates (unstandardized b coefficients) are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
 
  
                                                        
7 In our view, the causal role of attitudes as determinants of alignment with these parties could be effectively 
demonstrated by showing the lack of explanatory power on the behalf of identity items. If attitudes are to be 
interpreted as consequence of partisanship, this must be due to pre-existing social identities. However, a clear 
lack of explanatory power by identity items – that is, a substantial absence of long-term social ties between 
parties and partisans – looks us as a strong proof in favor of the independent role of attitudes as drivers of par-
tisan alignments. 
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Table 2:  Logistic Regression Estimates (unstandardized b coefficients) – Italy, 1990-2008 
 
  
                        
  




1990 1996 2001 2006 2008 1990 1996 2001 2006 2008 
  
  Church 
Attendance -.569 -.343 -.232 -.209 -.091   .535 -.053 .080 .070 .086 
  
    (,091)** (,048)** (,045)** (,057)** (,042)*
  
(,092)** (,063) (,040)* (,061) (,043)*
  
  Union Mem-
bership 
.801 .977 .834 .700 .804
  
-.241 -1.002 -.637 -.255 -.657   
    (,243)** (,144)** (,146)** (,194)** (,290)**
  
(,279) (,267)** (,180)** (,255) (,439)
  
  Social Class -.182 -.017 -.031 -.003 n/a
  
.207 .139 .065 .056 n/a   
    (,097) (,052) (,049) (,059)
  
(,099)* (,067)* (,045) (,065) 
  
  Region of 
Residence 
-.324 -.817 -.373 -.161 -.152
  
-.298 .396 -.053 .074 -.080   
    (,221) (,132)** (,076)** (,092) (,075)*
  
(,236) (,190) (,067) (,100) (,074)
  
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
  Nagelkerke R
2 .243 .192 .069 .048 .028   .147 .051 .028 .010 .012 
  
          
  
      
  Issue 
Proximity 
-.516 -.640 -.916 -.710 -.388
  
-.566 -.549 -.638 -.585 -.178   
    (,087)** (,066)** (,079)** (,094)** (,057)**
  
(.098)** (,091)** (,060)** (,099)** (,050)**
  
  Leader Eva-
luation 
.402 .750 .371 .411 .653
  
.243 .801 .664 .746 .766   
    (,065)** (,063)** (,049)** (,063)** (,058)**
  
(.071)** (,090)** (,052)** (,082)** (,055)**
  
  Goverment 
Eval. (retro) 
n/a n/a .211 -.102 .327
  
n/a n/a -.088 .001 -.091   




  Added Nagelkerke R2 
.253 .400 .444 .406 .456   .203 .457 .469 .538 .442 
  
          
  
      
  Nagelkerke R
2 
(Total) 
.496 .592 .513 .454 .484
  
.350 .508 .497 .548 .454
  
  
                        
  
Note:  Dependent variable: Partisanship (dummy). Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Controls 
include: age, gender, education. 
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Table 3:  Logistic Regression Estimates (unstandardized b coefficients) – Germany, 1990-2005 
 
  
                        
  
  




1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005  
  Church 
Attendance -.394 -.251 -.242 -.213 -.158   .381 .314 .474 .460 .334 
  
    (,067)** (,064)** (,059)** (,036)** (,046)**
  
(,063)** (,059)** (,065)** (,035)** (,048)**   
  Union Mem-
bership 
.694 .727 .664 .775 .530
  
-.680 -.862 -.309 -.723 -.591   
    (,230)** (,180)** (,174)** (,116)** (,172)**
  
(,250)** (,204)** (,212) (,151)** (,210)**   
  West/East n/a -.646 -.335 -.564 -.341
  
n/a .261 -.136 -.314 .129   
      (,173)** (,152)* (,101)** (,169)*
  
(,147) (,155) (,110)**  (.164)   
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
  Nagelkerke R
2 .096 .077 .054 .055 .043   .170 .121 .123 .138 .087  
            
  
           
  Issue 
Proximity 
-.362 -.216 -.218 -.249 -.447
  
-.329 -.567 -.319 -.369 -.523   
    (,065)** (,051)** (,053)** (,036)** (,061)**
  
(,065)** (,066)** (,056)** (,033)** (,055)**   
  Leader Evalua-
tion 
.432 .535 .497 .700 .750
  
.886 .633 .386 .519 .520   
    (,051)** (,048)** (,043)** (,033)** (,052)**
  
(,100)** (,062)** (,040)** (,030)** (,043)**   
  Goverment 
Eval. (retro) 
-.161 -.228 n/a n/a n/a
  
.351 .299 n/a n/a n/a   
    (,056)** (,045)**     
  
(,078)** (,063)**     
  Added 
Nagelkerke R2 
.354 .317 .273 .355 .495   .411 .496 .249 .373 .359  
            
  
    
  Nagelkerke R
2 
(Total) 
.450 .394 .327 .410 .538
  
.581 .617 .372 .511 .446   
  Chi-Square 283.195 333.080 276.990 909.197 675.512
  
402.395 631.067 317.094 1145.925 522.706   
  Valid N 719 986 1084 2660 1373
  
722 1061 1088 2613 1373   
  
                        
  











Table 4:  Logistic Regression Estimates (unstandardized b coefficients) – The Netherlands, 1994-2006 
 
  
                      
  
  Partij van de Arbeid   Christen Democratisch Appèl   
  
  
1994 1998 2002 2006 1994 1998 2002 2006   
  
Church Attendance -.422 -.464 -.389 -.598   .677 .759 .544 1.712   
    (,088)** (,090)** (,083)** (,130)**
  
(,066)** (,067)** (,053)** (,151)**
  Union Membership .977 .973 .709 .322
  
-.360 .005 -.043 -.114
    (,203)** (,188)** (,189)** (,148)*
  
(,277) (,259) (,198) (,160)
  Social Class -.100 -.495 -.387 -.309
  
.024 .176 .112 .213
    (,104) (,102)** (,103)** (,068)**
  
(,126) (,133) (,112) (,070)**
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.  
  Nagelkerke R
2 .124 .147 .104 .054   .328 .372 .204 .191   
            
  
          
  Issue Proximity -.423 -.438 -.418 -.301
  
-.351 -.447 -.253 -.398
    (,074)** (,080)** (,076)** (,053)**
  
(,086)** (-,115)** (,076)** (,057)**
  Leader Evaluation .440 .517 .506 .800
  
.506 .737 .594 .577
    (0,077)** (,076)** (,066)** (,065)**
  
(,099)** (,087)** (,078)** (,072)**
  Goverment Eval. 
(retro) 
-.126 .186 .231 -.136
  
-.308 .010 .047 .142
    (,063)* (,068)** (,071)** (,024)**
  
(,080)** (,077) (,050) (,023)**
  Added Nagelkerke R
2 .169 .148 .239 .307   .133 .148 .126 .237   
       
  
    
  Nagelkerke R
2 (Total) .293 .295 .343 .361 .461 .520 .330 .428
  Chi-Square 197.237 232.261 259.704 463.933 310.442 374.208 266.265 606.565
  Valid N 1264 1570 1459 1920 1254 1336 1408 1924
  
                    
Note:  Dependent variable: Partisanship (dummy). Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Controls 
include: age, gender, education. 
 
Moving again from the Italian case, we start with an overall assessment of the predictive power of the 
various models, as measured by the coefficient of multiple determination (Nagelkerke R2). As shown in 
Table 2, the sum of identity and attitudinal items explains partisanship in a substantially uniform 
manner (pseudo-R2 ranging between .45 and .59 in the case of centre-left parties, and between .45 
and .55 in the case of FI/PdL). Yet the key finding from the table lies in the constantly declining power 
of identity items to explain individuals’ feeling of closeness to parties. The most marked decrease ap-
pears with respect to centre-right parties, where the explanatory power of identity items falls below 
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pseudo-R2 = .10 already in 1996 – that is, as soon as the DC is replaced by Forza Italia. Furthermore, 
the regression coefficients relative to identity items are almost always insignificant, and we note the 
very weak part played by church attendance as a statistical predictor of closeness to FI. On the centre-
left side of the spectrum, identity items are slower in falling below the .10 threshold – which they 
eventually do in 2001. However, it is also interesting to note how in 2008 the ability of identity items 
to predict feelings of closeness to the brand-new Partito Democratico gets to triviality (pseudo-R2 = 
.03), thus signaling the intrinsically catch-all nature of the new leading actor of Italian centre-left. 
The statistical model, as applied to the German case, appears to behave in a slightly more erratic fa-
shion (cumulative pseudo-R2 ranging between .32 and .54 in the case of SPD, and between .37 and .61 
in the case of CDU). Nonetheless, Table 3 shows a monotonic decrease in the predictive power of iden-
tity items when the dependent variable is the respondents’ closeness to SPD (pseudo-R2 < .10 in the 
1990s, and around .05 in the 2000s). In the case of CDU, the identity component denotes a slower 
decline, but it eventually falls below the .10 threshold in the last time-point for which we have availa-
ble data (2005). 
Consistently with the above discussion, the Netherlands emerge as the country where the identity 
component plays the comparatively stronger part in shaping feelings of closeness to parties (see Sec-
tion 3). Table 4 presents the regression estimates of our model as applied to the Dutch case. This seems 
to perform better when the dependent variable is CDA partisanship (cumulative pseudo-R2 between 
.33 and .52) than in the case of PvdA (range between .26 and .36). The former comes forward as the 
most ‘identitarian’ party among those under analysis. In the case of CDA, in fact, identity items explain 
a significant part of the variance in the dependent variable, and especially in 1990s. The 2000s show 
nonetheless a reduction in the explanatory power of the identity component, which gets to a mini-
mum in 2006 (pseudo-R2 < .20). The case of PvdA is denoted by a weaker role played by identity items 
throughout our time-series. Most important to our purposes is, however, their progressive decline 
(pseudo-R2 < .20 in the 1990s and beneath the .10 threshold in the 2000s). Especially interesting is the 
steady decline in the magnitude of the coefficient relative to union membership, which witnesses the 
progressive de-attachment of PvdA from the working class in the last two decades. 
Based on these empirical evidences, we can assert that the changing nature and content of partisan 
alignments is a widespread phenomenon in our three democracies. This is constantly connoted by a 
sharp decline in the ability of identity items to explain partisanship, and by a correspondingly tighter 
relationship between favorable attitudes towards partisan objects and individual feelings of closeness 
to a party. In the following step of the analysis, we will attempt to assess the relative power of various 
attitude forces in determining partisan ties, in order to verify whether – in accordance with our core 
research hypothesis – attitudes towards the party leader have actually become the strongest statistical 
predictor of closeness to parties. To our purposes, it is worth noting that coefficients related to atti-
tude items are comparable in magnitude8. 
Consistently with our expectations, the Italian case emerges as paradigmatic of the crucial role exerted 
by party leaders in shaping feelings of attachment towards their parties. Moving from the centre-
right, we note that in the case of DC the regression coefficient relative to issue proximity is twice as 
big as that relative to leader evaluations. The entrance of FI as main centre-right actor in Italian poli-
tics results, unsurprisingly, in a massive increase in the predictive power of leader evaluations (strong-
est statistical predictor in each model) at the expense of the issue component. In the case of centre-
left parties we find signs of a strong effect of the leadership component already in 1996, but overall it 
is the issue component to play the biggest part in the various models. Its dominance is nonetheless put 
                                                        
8 Both leader evaluations and retrospective government evaluations are scaled on a range from ‘0’ to ‘10’, while 
the way we operationalized issue proximity (e.g., the distance between the self and the party on a 11-point left-
right scale, in absolute value) leads to the same range of possible values. 
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to an end in correspondence with the 2008 election. To understand this finding, it must be highlighted 
the preeminent part played by Walter Veltroni in both the foundation of PD and its electoral cam-
paign. The personalization of the political supply (usually a peculiarity of the Italian centre-right) on 
the behalf of the centre-left represented to some the real innovation of the 2008 campaign (Barisione 
and Catellani, 2008). Our data seem to demonstrate the usefulness of this strategy – at least with 
regard to its ability of developing in a pretty short time a feeling of closeness between a substantial 
number of voters and a brand-new party. But most of all, this finding seems to confirm the crucial 
role of party change as the prime mover behind the progressive personalization of the dynamics of 
partisan alignment in Italy. 
As explained above, we decided to compare Italy with Germany and the Netherlands on the grounds of 
their widely different patterns of party system development. Therefore, verifying our main research 
hypotheses also with respect to the latter countries would boost our confidence in the effect of party 
transformation on the changing nature of partisan attachments outside the (too often quoted) Italian 
borders of uniqueness. Instead of discussing the results from Germany and the Netherlands separately, 
we will rather look at the similarities observed in the patterns of partisan alignment with respect to 
both Dutch and German social-democratic parties, on the one hand, and on the Christian-democratic 
parties, on the other hand. As to the former, our regression analyses show a clear trend towards perso-
nalization, with the coefficient relative to leader evaluations rising almost monotonically at the ex-
pense of the issue component (while performance judgments seem to play hardly a role). However, we 
note that centre-right parties do not conform fully to this trend. In the case of Dutch CDA, the leader 
component is always stronger than the issue component, but there is no uniform increase in the re-
gression coefficients throughout time. More complicated is the case of German CDU, where we ob-
serve a sort of de-personalization trend (the leader component gets progressively smaller as compared 
to the issue component, and roughly equivalent in 2005). Indeed this represents the only party among 
those under analysis for which leader evaluations have become, in the last two decades, a less impor-
tant determinant of partisanship. A possible explanation of this finding will be discussed in the next 
section, where we try to take stock of the evidence collected throughout this analysis and draw some 
avenues for further research. 
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5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we hope to have shown the dramatic changes occurred in the last two decades in the 
origins and content of mass partisanship in Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. Although the relative-
ly few and recent points in time covered in our analysis did not allow to fully assessing the long-term 
decline of pre-existing social identities as determinants of individual feelings of attachment to parties, 
we can nonetheless affirm that contemporary partisanship appears (more) strongly related to voters’ 
attitudes towards more visible partisan objects, such as policies and individual leaders. In the light of 
the evidence collected throughout this analysis, the trend looks more evident on the case of former 
class-mass parties from the left (e.g., Dutch PvdA, German SPD, and Italian Left-Democrats), but it 
looks on its way also on the right (e.g., Dutch CDA and German CDU). 
As argued at the beginning of this paper, we would tend to impute such change to the process of 
transformation undergone by former class-mass parties in Western Europe as a response to the pro-
gressive erosion of traditional group affiliations in advanced industrial societies. The decline of social 
cleavages, along with the fall of ideologies, has forced these parties to reshape their appeal in order to 
extend the electoral basin beyond the socio-ideological cleavages to which they usually referred. 
Based on the idea that partisanship is responsive to the set of alternatives available in a political sys-
tem, our analysis has indeed shown that such transformations at the party level are clearly reflected in 
the dynamics of partisan alignment at the individual level – nowadays a matter of attitudes rather 
than identity. 
With respect to attitudes themselves, we have shown the primacy of leader evaluations as opposed to 
issue proximity and performance assessments. Based on the most recent literature on political com-
munication (for a review, see: Campus, 2010) we have reasons to believe that technological innova-
tions, and television in particular, have been crucial in this respect. Televised communication accen-
tuates personality factors at the expense of ideology and programmatic goals – the former being at 
the same time easier to understand for contemporary ‘reasoning voters’ (Popkin, 1994). Not by chance, 
our analysis has clearly highlighted the emergence of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (and later, PdL) as 
paradigm of the changing dynamics of partisan alignment. Yet the strong finding of the analysis is 
another, and lies in the observation that North-European parties of longer tradition are following the 
very same path.  
Among the parties we analyzed, the only exception to this conclusion is represented by German CDU, 
where we witnessed a sort of de-personalization trend. However, one should also note that our time-
series begin in 1990 – that is, the year in which Helmut Kohl’s popularity was at its climax. To under-
stand the declining role of party evaluations as determinants of CDU partisanship in the 2000s, it must 
be considered the importance of Kohl’s figure for his party – as well as for the country he led for 16 
years – in the 1990s. His imposing stature has been so far difficult to match for those who followed 
him (the actual CDU leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, is an eloquent case in point). Looking at our 
empirical results with this in mind, we would be inclined to interpret the de-personalization of CDU 
partisanship not as a disconfirmation of our hypothesis, but rather as a further hint of the crucial 
importance played today by a popular leader for the successful appeal of his (or her) party. 
A note of caution is in order here. The main hypothesis of this study implies a causal relationship be-
tween leader evaluations and the development of partisan ties – a causal relationship which is howev-
er not directly testable with large-n surveys based on structured questionnaires. Nonetheless, this 
paper has shown quite clearly that attitudes toward leaders and attitudes towards parties (partisan-
ship) are strongly related. It also shows that – limitedly to the last two decades – they are increasingly 
so. Future research based on more experimental techniques such as counter-factuals (i.e., van Holsteyn 
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and Andeweg, 2010) or vignettes (Finch, 1987) will certainly provide more direct evidence for the 
direction of this causal process.  
What are the implications of our findings for cross-national research in electoral politics? Against the 
common wisdom that sees popular party leaders as a fundamental asset for their parties, the scientific 
community has been almost unanimous in downplaying the electoral effects of leader images in dem-
ocratic elections, in virtue of the pre-eminent role played by pre-existing partisan affiliations on vot-
ers’ choice (King, 2002). The empirical evidence presented in this paper represents, in our opinion, a 
chance to resolve this tension. In the light of the increasingly crucial role exerted by party leader eval-
uations on individuals’ feelings of attachment to parties, we believe that the electoral effect of an 
attractive leader needs not to be found in the net gain of votes due to his/her strictly personal appeal, 
but rather in the improved image in voters’ mind of the party he leads and personifies (Curtice, 2003; 
McAllister, 2007; Barisione, 2009). In this sense, leaders can be thought to affect vote choices through 
partisanship. Of course, much more research is needed in order to substantiate this claim. The modest 
hope of this paper is that of having oriented the discussion on the right track. 
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Appendix B – Party Identification Question Wording 
 
Germany 
Many people in the Federal Republic lean toward a particular party for a long time, although they may vote for a 
different party. How about you? Do you in general lean toward a particular party? 
 
Italy 
Is there any political party that you feel closer to than others? 
 
The Netherlands 
Many people think of themselves as adherents of a particular party, but there are many other people who do not 




Appendix C – Variable Codings 
 
Gender 
Male (0), Female (1) 
 
Age 
Age in years 
 
Educational Level 
[DE&IT] Elementary Sc. (1), Middle Sc. (2), High Sc. (3), University (4) 
[NL] Scale from lowest (1) to highest (10) 
 
Church Attendance 
Never (1), 2/3 Times a year (2), Once a month (3), 2/3 Times a month (4), Every week (5) 
 
Union Membership 
No (0), Yes (1) 
 
Social Class 
Working Class (1), Rural petite bourgeoisie (2), Urban petite bourgeoisie (3), White collar middle class (4), Bour-
geoisie (5) 
 
Region of Residence 
[IT] Val d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino Alto-Adige, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (1); Emilia-
Romagna, Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise (0); Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia, 
Sardegna (-1) 
[DE] West Germany (0), East Germany (1) 
 
Left-Right Self Placement 
Scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 (‘right’) 
 
Leader Evaluation 
Scale from 0 (‘completely negative evaluation’) to 10 (‘completely positive evaluation’) 
 
Retrospective Government Evaluation 
Scale from 0 (‘really bad’) to 10 (‘really well’) 
 
